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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2872 
 ___________ 
 
 MAURICIO MATERON, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
WARDEN DAVID EBBERT, Allenwood FCI 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-0648) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 25, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  September 28, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Mauricio Materon appeals the District Court‟s order denying his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
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I.O.P. 10.6. 
Materon is a federal prisoner.  On October 12, 2010, Officer Morales observed 
Materon speaking on a cellular phone in his cell.  Officer Morales confiscated the phone, 
and Materon was charged with possession, manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous 
tool in violation of Code 108, 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3.  After a hearing, the Unit 
Disciplinary Committee found Materon guilty of the Code 108 offense.  The Discipline 
Hearing Officer (DHO) noted that Materon did not dispute that he had possessed a cell 
phone, and held that this constituted a violation of Code 108.  More specifically, the 
DHO concluded that cell phones qualify as “hazardous tools” because they have “been 
used to arrange rendezvous for escapes” and “to arrange contraband introductions.”  This 
interpretation, the DHO, stressed, was consistent with a memorandum issued by Warden 
Donna Zickefoose.  Materon was sentenced to 30 days of disciplinary segregation, 
disallowance of 40 days of good conduct time, forfeiture of 540 days of non-vested good 
conduct time, and loss of various privileges.   
In April 2011, Materon filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 
District Court.  Materon claimed that the DHO had violated his due process rights by 
finding him guilty of the Code 108 offense.  According to Materon, cell phones did not 
qualify as “hazardous tools” under 108; rather, his conduct was punishable under only 
Code 305, which prescribes less-severe penalties than Code 108.  The District Court 
denied Materon‟s petition, and Materon filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.1 
                                                 
1
 Challenges by federal prisoners to the loss of good time credits are properly brought under § 
2241, see Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009), and a certificate of appealability 
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Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits.  See Vega, 
493 F.3d at 317 n.4.  When a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good 
time credits, the prisoner is entitled to “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 
charges; (2) an opportunity . . . to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his 
defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the 
reasons for the disciplinary action.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  In 
addition, the disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” — that is, “any 
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 
board.”  Id. at 455-56. 
Materon presents a single argument — that Code 305, not Code 108, covers his 
offense.  Code 108 prohibits “[p]ossession, manufacture, or introduction of a hazardous 
tool (Tools most likely to be used in an escape or escape attempt or to serve as weapons 
capable of doing serious bodily harm to others; or those hazardous to institutional 
security or personal safety; e.g., hack-saw blade).”  28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3.  Code 
305, meanwhile, prohibits “[p]ossession of anything not authorized for retention or 
receipt by the inmate, and not issued to him through regular channels.”  Id. 
We agree with the District Court that Materon‟s argument lacks merit.  The DHO 
determined, in accordance with a memorandum issued by the warden, that cell phones 
were “hazardous tools” because they could be used to facilitate escape or to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                             
is not required to appeal the denial of a federal prisoner‟s § 2241 petition, see Burkey v. 
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal conclusions and 
apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.  Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 
314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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other illegal activities, and thus represent “a threat to the security and orderly running of 
the institution.”  Therefore, the DHO concluded, Materon‟s conduct was punishable 
under Code 108.  This interpretation is consistent with the language of Code 108, and we 
thus discern no error in the DHO‟s analysis.  See Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 
389 (3d Cir. 2001) (“An agency‟s interpretation of its own regulation is 
„controlling . . . unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.‟” 
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).   
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order denying 
Materon‟s § 2241 petition.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
